Introduction
The slogan, "Fiji the way the world should be" has since the events of 1987 lost much of its appeal except for perhaps the most diehard and naive tourists. Even staunch Fijian nationalists acknowledge that the country has been beset by economic and political turmoil. The state of industrial relations reflects dmstic restructuring, not only affecting the workplace but other aspects of working people's lives. Many of the patterns in Fiji's political and economic transfot mation reflect changes elsewhere, particularly as a result of the growing intemationalisation of capital and labour. Both proponents and opponents of Fiji's industrial and economic restructuring look to models and e~amples outside the Pacific Islands. Fiji's government may "see the country as becoming a modest South Pacific Singapore'' (Islands Business, March 1991, p.l6) 'UC 1990a, p.43 ) .
• announced plans to follow IMF recommendations and introduce a value-added tax (VAT) of 10 percent on several goods and services in July 1992.
While the interim administration has been advocating deregulation of the labour market, it has not extended its avowed economic liberalisation to the activities of trade unions. A number of intended refo1 Ins to the labour lẽgislation wẽre announced at the 1991 NES summit which were aimed to deal with two faults Kamikamica identified: trade union immunity from prosecution for damages when acting outside the law and the internal functioning of trade unions. Suggested amendments to the Trade Unions Act were to encourage the development of company based unions and tighten up the procedures for detennining recognition of trade unions. Recommended changes to the Trade Disputes Act included a wider definition of a strike to include fo1ms of industrial action such as a go-slow, work-to-rule, or withdrawal of goodwill. Amendments to the Industrial Associations Act were designed to disallow industrial associations from acting as trade unions. This clear! y was aimed at restraining one of Fiji's strongest industrial associations, the National Farmers' Union (NFU), and curtailing the growing industrial muscle demonstrated by Fiji's newest industrial association. , the Fiji Association of Garment Workers.
Specific proposals which would effectively make trade union recognition, recruitment and organisation more difficult also included proposed amendments to the Trade Union (Recognition) Act to abolish the legal requirement for employers to deduct union dues from employees, the introduction of secret ballots and the introduction of time limits on the validity of strike ballots.
The rationale for labour reform
It is suggested that the administration's rationale for implementing labour refotnls stems primarily from their broader economic policy and deswe to curb trade union opposition to this. The aim of controlling trade union activities and, as many unions argue, to weaken them, is also part of an ongoing response to union opposition to the regime. Union opposition has not just been directed at employment matters, but has embraced broader political issues, such as the legitimacy of Fiji's new constitution. However motives for advocating refo1ms were couched in other reasons given by government ministers. To justify proposals to abolish minimum wages and wages councils, Vunibobo argued that employment opportunities would be generated which would help alleviate poverty. Poverty in Fiji has become a politically contentious issue with estimates of approximately 15-20 percent of Fiji's population in absolu~e poverty and a higher proportion considered to be in relativẽ pov, erty (Barr 1990 ). Kamikamica's case for labour refonn was presented in culturalist tenns: I see the biggest challenge now facing Fiji as being in the area of labour market refonn, where the cultural traditions of our ethnic groups here mingle with the cultural and ideological traditions of Europe in an often uncomfortable combination (NES papers 1991, p.l7).
He then went on to say that "The challenge for government is to ensure an economic ẽnvironment in which competitive business can operate."
This latter statement points towards the administration's more fundamental economic objectives, for which the restructuring of the labour market was deemed necessary. Official policy sought to encourage the growth of export production, and as discussed below, industrial unrest could threaten investment and production · within the tax-free export sector. Workers had also shown, in the building industry, for example, that they would not take redundancies consulted~ that the correct procedures to enforce the rates had been ignored and that the rates were too low. The minimum rate gives a net pay of $25 a week out of which workers, many being sole income earners for their families, would have to meet expenditure for food, housing, transport, electricity, water, children's education and other necessities (FT, 3 November 1990) .
It is not surprising that with the continuation of wages frequently well below a basic poverty level of $72 a week or the estimated average national wage of $50 a week for an unskilled worker and with working conditions considered by many to be 'sweated,' that · workers both within and outside the garment industry have been agitating for better pay and conditions. A report by the Ministry of Employment and Industrial Relations (MEIR) found that almost two-thirds of surveyed factories paid less than 51 cents an hour and four-fifths avoided paying overtime (Cole, 1991 ) . Esiteri Tuilovoni, Secretary of the Fiji Association of Garment Workers, confirms that even the minimum wages and conditions of the wages council are not being enforced This is particularly difficult to do when manufacturing is sub-contracted to family businesses or when employers transfer workers to another enterprise to avoid paying full-rates after the six month training period. Manufacturers also maintain it is often necessary to have long work-shifts if export deadlines are to be met. Other complaints, such as sexual harassment, are even more difficult to report and enforce.
While such practices are still widespread, both the interim government and some · manufacturers have become somewhat more sensitive to the tarnished image that sweated labour can project abroad. In spite of an official delay of eight months, the Fiji Association of Garment Workers (FAGW) was fouually registered in 1989 and in 1990 had around 1152 members (F*I' UC, 1990, p.94) . Employer recognition has been even slower and rarely is considered until after garment workers have taken industrial action.
The second half of 1990 saw a number of unprecedented strikes in which the FAGW was involved. In September 1990, 75 gauoent workers from an Austr, alian owned shirt ma1cing factory, Mark One Apparel, walked away from their machines because of management's failure to deliver promised pay increases or provide sick pay, and the alleged continuation of discriminatory bonus payments (FT, 4 September 1990) . Mark Hellaby, the manager, argued that efficiency was low at the factory although workers suggested that if they were paid the same wages as his employees in Australia, their output would inCfease: "You give us the incentive and we'll give you the work ethic." After three days a compromise was reached over the pay increase.
However in October 1990 a 15 day strike by approximately 400 workers at the Just Cham Garment Company (a joint venture with a New Zealand Company Alex Young) appeared to escalate with Ema Druavesi, past-Secietary of FAGW, threatening a national strike by garment workers, the Fl'UC threatening a boycott of the factory and the company warning that it would dismiss the strikers (FT, 20 October 1990; 22 October 1990) . With wages averaging $20 a week, low pay was again a central issue, but the workers list of 24 grievances included complaints about inadequate toilet facilities, excessive overtime without extra payment or transport being provided, no annual leave, no tea breaks, excessively heavy work, no employer responsibility for accidents or sick leave and the practice of strip searching if any items went missing (FT, 10 October 1990) . The FI'UC claimed that any worker who 'Barr (1990) The framing of the 1991 Sugar Industry Decree was therefore aimed at not only inhibiting stoppages in the sugar industry but also counteracting the strong internal and international support the cane farmers had This did not deter Felix Anthony from threatening that his union, the Fiji Sugar General Wor~ers' Union, would take industrial action if cane was forcibly harvested or if cane farmers were intimidated by the police and other authorities (FT, 8 July 1991; 8 August 1991) . With 2,000 members, this was the largest union in the sugar industry, ahead of the Fiji Sugar Tradesmens' Union, the Clerks' and Supervisors' Association and the union representing management staff, the Sugar Milling Staff Officers' Association.
Confrontation between sugar workers and FSC management was exacerbated in July 1991 when 1,000 workers were laid-off due to the lack of cane-supplies. At least a further 1,000 mill-workers protested at this action by stopping work until the FSC agreed to compensate for lost wages. (FT, 4 July 1991). The Sugar Milling Staff Officers' Association took a somewhat ambivalent stand by supporting calls for a general strike, giving lukewarm support to the sugar wor~ers already on strike, yet also threatening industrial action among its field staff if they were intimidated by growers' organisations while preparing and organising sugar harvesting gangs (FT, 8 July 1991; 10 July 1991) .
The 1991 crisis in the sugar industry escalated with riot police being deployed to Western Fiji's cane districts and claims from NFU Rakiraki branch President, Marika Silimaibau, that police and district officers were pressuring farmers to harvest (FT, 1 June 1991). Doubts about police and anny support for enforcing the decrees began to be raised after Fiji's President warned that soldiers might cut cane (FT, 5 June 1991) . Although Ratu Viliame Tagivetu~ · the District Officer of B~ cited the new sugar dec1ee to ban a proposed meeting of 10,000 farmers, Philip Amfield, the new Police Commissioner did not see it as illegal. While many farmers were intimidated from attending, a private meeting of 2000 NFU members called on government to revoke the dectees and resolved to seek solidarity from international trade unions (FT, 8 June 1991) . The enactment of the decrees increased local awareness and support for the cane farmers original grievances. A similar pattẽrn devẽloped in Fiji's troubled goldmining industry . .
Industrial relations 'underground': the Vatukoula dispute
On 4 June 1991 the Fiji Timl!s ran an advertisement for Taniela Veitata, the Minister of Employment and Industrial Relations, in which he described Kavekini Navuso, the General Secretary of the recently registered Fiji Mine Workers Union (FMWU) as "like a man possessed". This battle of words fought in the newspapers was ovẽr Navuso's efforts to gain voluntary recognition for the FMWU by the Emperor Goldmining Company (managed by a former Australian shareholder, Western Mining Company). Refusal to grant recognition in (FI', 16 July 1991) . The FMWU later agreed to seek compulsory recognition but insisted that first govetnment appoint a conciliator. This stand was taken because the union had "no confidence in the ministry's impartiality" (Fl', 16 July 1991) . By August 1991, the MEIR finally recognised that an industrial dispute existed but still refused to recognise the FMWU as the legitimate representative of the strikers. Emperor Goldmining continued to boycott conciliation meetings.
Official views, as with the industrial unrest in the gm n M?nt and sugar industries, also dismissed the mining strike as being politically motivated. Veitata suggested that the strike was prolonged intentionally by Navuso and suppmters in the FLP/NFP. Coalition to coincide with the sugar harvesting boycott "as pan of their concened efforts to destabilise the country" (FI', 4 June 1991). Union officials have not denied that there is a deep-seated political basis to this dispute but they have thrown the ball in the other coun, pointing to long-standing political links between Emperor Goldmining and sone members of the current regime (Fiji 14bour Sentinel, March 1991).
The often-bandied bogey of indigenous Fijian domination by supposedly power-hungry Indian unionists has not been applicable to the go]dmining dispute, as most of the miners are ethnic Fijians. Public support for their plight was strengthened when, at the miners' request, Methodist church leaders intervened to assist in reaching a solution. Rabuka also made it clear that he would not allow the army to be used against the strikers. The long duration of the strike would not have been possible without food and financial assistance from local and overseas unions and other suppotters in Fiji. As with the sugar decree, the District Officer of Ba also decided to invoke provisions of the decree by barring the FMWU from mounting a public appeal in his district (Fl', 1 June 1991 ).
Dealing with officialdom
The disputes outlined in this paper reveal the difficulties in resolving industrial conflict through the established industrial relations channels. Long before the coups, major unions, such as the FPSA, accused management and govetument ministries of deliberate slowness in resolving grievances and disputes (l~kie, 1988, pp.162-4) . This has been compounded since the coups, not only because of the incteased politicisation of official intervention in industrial relations, but due to personnel shonages and the resignation of experienced senior labour officers.
Since the coups several unions have complained of the MEIR's reluctance to enforce collective agieements and the rejection of disputes without any valid reasons being given (FIUC, 1990, p.56) . Frustrated workers have two main options: taking strike action or entering into expensive and even more time consuming litigation through the High Coun.
The FfUC has also complained of the MEIR's bias towards employers. Alternatively when arbitration awards have been in the union's favour, this has been challenged by employers through judicial reviews. This delays any settlement being reached and has compelled unions to dip into their often limited funds to meet legal expenses. · As noted, delays in enforcing labour related legislation have been especially prevalent in the rapidly expanding garment industry. The FAGW has also criticised labour officers' bias against workers registering complaints. Most garment workers who ue prepared to repon a grievance to the Ministry have ftrSt to overcome shyness and fear of victimisation by employers. Druavesi claimed that the MEIR was inconsistent in its criteria for accepting or rejecting a Industrial Relad0111 iD Post-coup Fiji 17 dispute. A repo1ted dispute over the disnaissal of tluee workers from Lotus Guxnents and the proposals to inttoduce VAT and labour refot•ns. Although the proposed strike was declared illegal by the administration, it drew suppon from non-FI'UC unions, with the exception of some ethnically based and pro-Taukef' unions.
Besides the threat of local industrial action the ¥,.....-rue called upon international affiliates for suppon. Such measures have been a powerful card the FI'UC has played since the coups (Leckie, 1991) . Vanderveken, General Secretary of the ICFI'U was quick to condemn what he regarded as an erosion of workers' rights, particularly because Fiji's interim administration had "specifically and unequivocally agteed" to ICFI'U missions during 1988 and 1989 not to make any changes to existing trade union legislation and to abide by the relevant international and ILO conventions (FT, 10 July 1991). In a letter to Ratu Mara he warned that the ICFI'U and the European Tmdes Union Congress were recommending that the European Community suspend all economic aid to Fiji. International affiliates of Fiji's trade unions were highly likely to impose ttade and communication bans if repressive legislation was put into practice to resolve the industrial crisis.
Pressure from workers within and outside Fiji was critical in the administration having to shelve the National Economy Protection decrees. Following a meeting held on 12 July between Chaudhry, Columbus, Rabuka and Gaunilau, the unions agteed to lift the strike threat, while the President stated that a conference would be held to settle the sugar dispute, that the decrees would be suspende<L and an attempt would be made to resolve the Vatukoula dispute. Agteement was also reached to refer details of the labour refot m changes and VAT to a tripartite meeting of the Labour Advisory Board.
This resolution was g~eeted by many unions as a victory for workers, particularly after government also announced that it would restore recognition of the FI'UC as the national union body. However few of the agteements reached on 12 July were implemented. By early 1992, the Vatukoula dispute remained unresolved. It seems likely VAT will be introduced in 1992. The interim government proceeded with its plans to introduce labour refotms, now with greater suppon from Fiji's employers' associations (FT, 2 September 1991, 6 November 1991). This was a departure from indications before 1991 when many employers endorsed F·ruc calls for a comprehensive review of labour legislation along the lines of an ILO sponsored (the Drake) report. The lack of resolution within the sugar industry precipitated the NFU into holding a strike during 5-7 November, just after the interim government promulgated dectees announcing labour refotms as outlined at the 1991 NES (Fiji Republic Gazette, 5(77) , 1 November 1991). The new refm•ns also clearly aimed to weaken Chaudhry's powerful role, by prohibiting an office holder from serving in more than one union or industrial association.
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Plans to abolish wages councils were shelved, although employers' organisations are pushing for a review of their operations (FT, 6 November 1991) .
Again, the see-saw pattern of post-coup industrial relations was set in action, with the FI'UC unsuccessfully seeking dialogue with the Ptime Minister, pursuing international solidarity suppon and threatening a general strike in February 1992. Both fotms of industrial action are illegal under the November decrees. 
